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1. Introduction 
In a series of papers, Amihud and Mendelson (1988, 1991, 2000, 2008) advocate that 
firms can and should actively pursue corporate policies aimed at increasing the liquidity 
of their publicly traded shares. The incentive is that improved liquidity leads to lower 
cost of equity capital and higher stock price, hence increasing the market value of the 
firm. Additional benefits of liquidity enhancement have been reported in the academic 
literature, such as better corporate governance (Edmans et al., 2013; Norli et al., 2015), 
more informative stock prices (Chordia et al., 2008; Chung and Hrazdil, 2010), higher 
managerial pay-for-performance sensitivity to stock prices (Jayaraman and Milbourn, 
2012) and lower corporate bankruptcy risk (Brogaard et al., 2017). Contrary to the 
popular view that firms care less about liquidity after their public listings and leave the 
task to stock exchange regulators, Dass et al. (2013) find that innovative firms do take 
specific steps to make their stocks more liquid, such as providing more frequent 
managerial guidance for future earnings, conducting stock splits, and making seasoned 
equity offerings. Amidst widespread analyst coverage terminations, Balakrishman et al. 
(2014) report that corporate managers deliberately seek to boost liquidity through the 
alternative means of voluntarily disclosing more information than mandated by 
legislation. The literature also documents that significant amounts of managerial time 
have been devoted to managing investor relations with the objective of increasing firms’ 
visibility and liquidity (Brennan and Tamarowski, 2000; Bushee and Miller, 2012; 
Karolyi and Liao, 2017). 
 
Despite theoretical predictions and the repeated calls for liquidity management, the first 
evidence supporting the firm value benefit of stock liquidity is only provided by the 
pioneering empirical work of Fang et al. (2009). Using U.S. stocks, these authors 
establish the positive causal effect of stock liquidity on Tobin’s Q. Subsequent 
delineation analyses show that it operates through the channels of informative stock 
prices and stock-based managerial compensation. Sampling international firms from 41 
countries over the period 1996-2010, Huang et al. (2014) confirm the positive 
relationship between stock liquidity and firm value across countries in their pooled 
analysis and within 36-40 countries in country-specific regressions. The value gains 
from improved stock liquidity are greater in countries with stronger investor protection, 
operating through its effect on the future growth of operating earnings rather than the 
cost of equity capital. Further conditions that strengthen the liquidity-firm value 
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relationship have been documented for firms in the real estate investment trust industry 
(Cheung et al., 2015), firms with large blockholdings (Bharath et al., 2013), and 
innovative firms with stronger equity-based managerial incentive contracts (Dass et al., 
2013). For single-country studies, Li et al. (2012) report evidence supporting corporate 
governance as the channel through which liquidity improves the valuation of Russian 
firms, while Nguyen et al. (2016) find that the higher valuations for liquid Australian 
stocks are driven mainly by enhanced stock prices. 
 
Given the conclusive empirical evidence on the value gains from higher stock liquidity, 
one might wonder why all firms do not pursue liquidity-increasing policies. The 
monotonic positive relationship between liquidity and firm value reported in all the 
above-cited studies implies the absence of an upper bound on the benefits that firms 
can derive from their deliberate strategies. In practice, maintaining liquidity is not a 
costless effort, and thus corporate managers must often weigh the tradeoff between 
potential costs and the well-reported valuation premium. For instance, Amihud and 
Mendelson (2000, 2008) highlight the direct costs incurred when providing more 
information to investors and expanding the investor base, and their indirect effects on 
firms’ competitive advantage and agency costs, respectively. On the other hand, Fang 
et al. (2014) find that higher liquidity exposes firms to a greater risk of hostile takeover 
and impedes their innovation productivity, while Chang et al. (2017) show that liquid 
firms are vulnerable to higher stock price crash risk due to managerial bad news 
hoarding. There is also evidence that higher liquidity is harmful for corporate 
governance (Roosenboom et al., 2014; Back et al., 2015). It is thus reasonable to expect 
an optimal or value-maximizing level of liquidity in which the marginal cost is equal 
to the marginal benefit (see Dass et al., 2013).  
 
Returning to the liquidity-firm value relationship, the possibility of a threshold level 
has been completely ignored by previous empirical studies, including the pioneering 
work of Fang et al. (2009). Although these authors outline five positive channels 
(liquidity premium, sentiment, positive feedback, pay-for-performance sensitivity and 
blockholder intervention), they also highlight two negative mechanisms (activist exit 
and negative feedback) through which liquidity might reduce firm value. While the 
negative channels might not be dominant in U.S. markets, the same cannot be expected 
for emerging stock exchanges due to differences in institutional setting, level of 
information efficiency, ownership structure, shareholder activism and investor 
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sophistication. Ignoring the dynamic interplays among the competing channels is likely 
to yield incorrect inferences as the relationship might change due to the dominance of 
opposing effects at different levels of liquidity. To reiterate the importance of functional 
form, we draw from the rich literature of managerial ownership-firm value, in which 
the pioneering theoretical work of Jensen and Meckling (1976) predicts a positive and 
linear relationship because higher managerial ownership better aligns managers’ 
incentives with those of outside shareholders and thus reduces agency costs. This 
uniformly positive association is later challenged theoretically by Stulz (1988) and 
empirically by Morck et al. (1988), who argue that firm value tends to fall when the 
equity stakes of managers grow larger as they are more likely to entrench themselves. 
Subsequent empirical studies generally support the existence of threshold levels in the 
relationship between managerial ownership and firm value, and fitting a nonlinear 
model is now the standard practice in ownership research given the tradeoff between 
the countervailing forces of positive incentive alignment and negative managerial 
entrenchment (see the survey paper by Chen et al., 2004). In stark comparison, the 
liquidity-firm value literature does not generate a similar level of enthusiasm among 
researchers, partly because the favorable empirical results are consistent with 
theoretical prediction and conventional wisdom.  
 
This study re-examines whether the previous consensus of a positive linear relationship 
between liquidity and firm value prevails in the emerging stock market of Malaysia, 
Bursa Malaysia.1 This is pertinent given its profound implications to stock exchange 
regulators and public listed firms in managing market-wide and firm liquidity, 
respectively. Apart from data accessibility and the literature gap, we argue that 
Malaysia presents an ideal testing ground based on four observations, which we further 
elaborate in Section 2. First, the positive channels driving the liquidity-firm value 
relationship in Fang et al. (2009), informative stock prices and equity-based managerial 
incentives, might not be dominant in emerging markets. Second, the negative channel 
                                                          
1 Our investigation is also motivated by Yung and Jian (2017) who re-examine the relationship between 
shareholder base, which has been found to be positively correlated with liquidity, and firm value. In a 
seminal paper, Merton (1987) shows theoretically that a larger shareholder base is associated with higher 
firm value. His theoretical prediction receives wide empirical support, largely from U.S. studies. In spite 
of this, Yung and Jian (2017) argue that the value benefit of a larger shareholder base might not prevail 
in emerging markets like China due to institutional heterogeneity such as ownership concentration, weak 
investor protection and poor corporate governance. Indeed, contrary to the evidence based on U.S. firms, 
these authors find a negative relationship between shareholder base and the valuation of Chinese firms 
which they attribute to elevated agency conflicts between the controlling shareholders and dispersed 
small investors. 
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of liquidity-induced blockholders exit might be stronger in Malaysia as the anecdotal 
evidence suggests the large withdrawals of foreign investors from the local bourse are 
often facilitated by the readiness of state-backed institutions to supply liquidity. Third, 
Malaysia presents a unique corporate landscape in which business, ethnicity and 
politics are closely linked. The entrenched culture of state patronage in business allows 
us to explore the moderating role of political connections on the liquidity-firm value 
relationship, an issue unexplored in the extant literature. Fourth, the complete 
ownership dataset for all publicly listed firms assembled by Bursa Malaysia, which is 
not available in companies’ annual reports or commercial databases, sheds further 
insight on the mechanisms linking liquidity to firm value.  
 
In our empirical analyses, we collect data for all non-financial firms traded on Bursa 
Malaysia over the sample period of 2000-2015. The baseline quadratic model regresses 
Tobin’s Q against “Closing Percent Quoted Spread” (CPQS) and a set of standard 
control variables. We find evidence of a nonlinear relationship between liquidity and 
firm value, with the U-shaped curve suggesting stocks must be traded at a higher level 
of liquidity before reaping the benefit of larger firm value. The empirical results also 
reiterate the importance of functional form, showing that a linear model might yield 
incorrect inferences when the relationship is driven by competing channels with 
opposing effects. Our key finding of a nonlinear relationship passes a series of 
robustness checks – alternative liquidity measures of price impact, alternative 
estimators (Fama-MacBeth two-step regression and quantile regression), formal 
statistical test for U-shape, excluding the crisis years of 2008-2009, industry-specific 
regressions, and endogeneity tests (lagged explanatory variables, change-in-variable 
regression, firm fixed effects and two-step system GMM). The use of lot size reduction 
for Malaysian stocks in May 2003 as exogenous liquidity shock establish the causal 
effect from liquidity to firm value. Further interaction analyses uncover three important 
moderating variables in the liquidity-firm value relationship, namely, political 
connections, foreign nominee ownership and foreign institutional ownership. These 
new findings provide indirect evidence of the mechanisms linking liquidity to firm 
value, which we hypothesize operate through the channels of cost of capital, stock price 
informativeness and corporate governance. While we do not expect our findings to be 
generalizable to developed mature markets, the possibility of a nonlinear relationship 
in other emerging markets with similar institutional and market features cannot be ruled 
out but such empirical verification will be left for future studies.  
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 formulates the four 
hypotheses to be tested in this empirical study. The variables and model specification 
are presented in Section 3, whereas the subsequent section describes the sample 
selection process and provides preliminary overview of the sample data. We discuss 
and interpret the key findings drawn from the baseline quadratic model in Section 5. 
Further interaction analyses on the moderating variables are conducted in Section 6. 
Concluding remarks are given in the final section.  
 
2. Development of Hypotheses 
This section discusses the existing empirical literature and unique Malaysian corporate 
landscape that provides the basis for our hypotheses, and thus the re-examination of the 
prevailing positive linear relationship between liquidity and firm value. 
 
2.1 The nonlinear relationship between liquidity and firm value 
Fang et al. (2009) provide the first empirical evidence supporting the firm value benefit 
of stock liquidity using data from U.S. stock markets. Their pioneering work lays out 
five possible theoretical channels through which liquidity might improve firm value, 
namely liquidity premium, sentiment, positive feedback, pay-for-performance 
sensitivity and blockholder intervention. However, these authors also highlight the 
possibility of a negative relationship between liquidity and firm value due to activist 
exit and negative stock price feedback effect. Through extensive analyses, they find 
that the positive causal effect of stock liquidity on Tobin’s Q operates through the 
channels of informative stock prices and stock-based managerial compensation. Their 
findings have subsequently received wide empirical support.  
 
We re-examine whether the previous consensus of a positive linear relationship 
between liquidity and firm value prevails in Bursa Malaysia. Apart from data 
accessibility and the literature gap, Malaysia nevertheless presents a fruitful avenue for 
research. First, the two channels that drive the positive liquidity and firm value 
relationship in Fang et al. (2009), informative stock prices and equity-based managerial 
incentives, might not be dominant in emerging markets such as Malaysia. Existing 
empirical evidence shows that emerging market firms generally have lower levels of 
information efficiency than their developed counterparts (see Morck et al., 2000; 
Griffin et al., 2010; Lim and Brooks, 2010). In the case of Malaysia, Lim et al. (2016) 
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find that the lower information efficiency is largely attributed to thin trading, illiquidity 
and the failure of key market participants (security analysts and local institutions) in 
performing their information roles. The task of improving the efficiency of the local 
bourse has been solely undertaken by foreign investors through their skilled processing 
of public information. On the other hand, although the granting of equity-based 
incentives in Malaysian public listed firms can be traced back to the early 1990s, they 
are largely allocated to non-executive employees (see Ismail, 2014). In contrast, 
executive stock options are not widely included as components of total managerial 
compensation in the local corporate environment, and the limited empirical studies 
provide conflicting evidence of their value-enhancing benefit (Ismail, 2014; Ibrahimy 
and Ahmad, 2016).  
 
Second, the negative channel of activist exit in the liquidity-firm value relationship 
might be stronger in the context of Malaysia. Coffee (1991) and Bhide (1993) argue 
that higher liquidity reduces the costs of exit and thus deters monitoring incentives, 
which encourages large shareholders to vote with their feet when firm performance is 
unsatisfactory. In an exclusive study of the Malaysian stock market, Liew et al. (2018) 
find that the readiness of local state-backed institutions to supply liquidity facilitates 
the large withdrawals of foreign investors from the local bourse since June 2013.2 These 
authors further document a one-way causality from aggregate liquidity to the total sales 
of local stocks by foreign investors, strengthening our conjecture that the negative effect 
of liquidity-induced blockholders exit might be a dominant force, especially at a higher 
level of liquidity. Third, although the performance of Malaysian public listed firms has 
been widely researched, their liquidity has been severely understudied as highlighted 
by Lim et al. (2017), and no Malaysian studies have been published on the relationship 
between liquidity and firm value.3 
 
Given the above considerations, we thus test the following hypothesis in alternative 
form: 
H1: There is a nonlinear relationship between stock liquidity and firm value. 
                                                          
2 Using portfolio flows data provided by Bursa Malaysia, Liew et al. (2018) report that foreign investors 
had been accumulating their holdings of Malaysian stocks since October 2009. The trend was reversed 
following the “taper tantrum”, however, with a net sale of foreign investors in the local bourse amounting 
to RM45.8 billion over the period June 2013– December 2016. 
3 The only exception is the cross-country study by Huang et al. (2014), who also estimate regression for 
each of the 41 countries in their sample, including Malaysia. The country-specific regression reveals a 
positive relationship between liquidity and firm value for Malaysian stocks, but their fitted linear model 
ignores the possibility of a threshold liquidity level.  
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2.2 The moderating role of political connection on liquidity-firm value relationship 
Our choice of Malaysia is also motivated by the unique corporate landscape in which 
business, ethnicity and politics are closely linked (see Gomez and Jomo, 1997; Gomez, 
2004; Gomez and Saravanamuttu, 2013; Gomez et al., 2018). The intertwining of 
politics and business is rooted in the National Economic Policy (NEP), a 20-year 
national development policy instituted after Malaysia’s 1969 race riots to address inter-
ethnic socio-economic imbalances. More specifically, to more equitably redistribute 
wealth that was concentrated in the hands of minority ethnic Chinese, the government 
strived to achieve 30% corporate equity ownership by Bumiputeras (literally “sons of 
the soil”) through affirmative action and various redistribution policies. This NEP 
model of state-led development to promote Bumiputera capitalism opens the door for 
extensive government intervention in the allocation of public investment resources to 
preferentially selected firms. While relationship-based capitalism is well entrenched in 
the economies of East Asia (see Rajan and Zingales, 1998), Gomez and Jomo (1997) is 
perhaps the first published study to systematically trace the close personal friendships 
between big business owners and top politicians prior to the outbreak of the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis, and their list of patronized corporations has been widely used to 
examine the economic consequences of political connections using Malaysia as the 
laboratory (earlier studies include Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Fraser et al., 2006; Gul, 
2006).4 This dataset of Gomez and Jomo (1997) has generally outlived its usefulness, 
however, mainly because the three dominant political figures were no longer in the 
Malaysian government during our sample period.5 While some of these established 
connections may have disappeared, newly forged political ties are documented by Fung 
et al. (2015), Wong (2016) and Tee et al. (2017), suggesting politics continues to be a 
unique feature of corporate Malaysia.  
 
                                                          
4 The literature subsequently experiences a phenomenal growth, especially after Faccio (2006) compiles 
an extensive database of 541 firms with political ties in 35 countries. While her international sample 
shows political connection is a worldwide phenomenon, Malaysia stands out with the second highest 
number of connected firms, accounting for 28.24% of the country’s total stock market capitalization. 
5 The dataset of Gomez and Jomo (1997) traces the firms’ close relationships with three key political 
figures since the early 1990s–then-Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, then-Deputy Prime Minister 
Anwar Ibrahim and Daim Zainuddin. After 22 years in power, Mahathir Mohamad handed over the 
premiership to Abdullah Badawi in October 2003, whereas Najib Razak took over the national leadership 
in April 2009. All three prime ministers came from the same political party, the United Malay National 
Organization (UMNO), which is the backbone of the coalition government that has ruled Malaysia since 
independence in 1957. Anwar Ibrahim was removed from the Malaysian cabinet and expelled from 
UMNO in September 1998, and subsequently convicted of corruption and jailed for six years. Daim 
Zainuddin, a former Finance Minister from July 1984–March 1991, was reappointed to the same portfolio 
in January 1999 but retired completely from public service in May 2001. 
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There is abundant empirical evidence that political connections exert significance 
influence on firm value, but the exact effect is ambiguous. On the one hand, the market 
valuation of firms increases because of the close ties forged with politicians or political 
parties in power (Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Faccio 2006; Goldman et al., 2009). Much 
of this value gain comes from preferential access to credit (Khwaja and Mian, 2005; 
Charumilind et al., 2006), lower cost of capital (Boubakri et al., 2012; Houston et al., 
2014), higher likelihood of government bailouts (Faccio et al., 2006; Blau et al., 2013), 
and lucrative government contracts (Duchin and Sosyura, 2012; Goldman et al., 2013). 
In contrast, political patronage can be detrimental to firm value due to rent-seeking and 
tunneling activities (Cheung et al., 2010; Ma et al., 2013; Habib et al., 2017), 
opportunistic earnings management (Ramanna and Roychowdhury, 2010; Braam et al., 
2015; Habib et al., 2017), and lower investment efficiency (Chen et al., 2011). Given 
the opposing effects of helping versus grabbing hands, it is not surprising that Chen et 
al. (2017) find a nonlinear relationship between the strength of political links and firm 
value.  
 
In the existing Malaysian studies, political connections are a crucial element in the local 
corporate landscape, serving as an important moderator in the relationship of corporate 
governance-audit fees (Bliss et al., 2011), ethnic diversity-firm value (Gul et al., 2016) 
and foreign institutional ownership-audit fees (Tee et al., 2017). We instead 
hypothesize that political connections are likely to moderate the relationship between 
liquidity and firm value. In the theoretical model of  Amihud and Mendelson (2000), 
cost of capital is the key channel linking liquidity and firm value, where the liquidity 
route to lower cost of capital increases firm value. Empirically, there is evidence that 
political connections influence such key channel.  For instance, the cross-country study 
by Boubakri et al. (2012) finds that investors require a lower cost of equity for firms 
with strong political ties because the latter are perceived to be less risky due to implicit 
government guarantees, especially during economic recessions. Using U.S. data, 
Houston et al. (2014) report a lower cost of bank loans for politically connected firms 
because lenders perceive them as having high creditworthiness.  
 
Given the unique corporate landscape of Malaysia, we test the following hypothesis in 
alternative form: 
 
H2:  Firms with political connections require higher level of liquidity than non-
politically connected firms in order to reap the benefit of larger firm value. 
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2.3 The moderating role of investor groups on liquidity-firm value relationship 
One important channel that might shape the stock liquidity-firm value relationship is 
the informativeness of stock prices, given the possibility of feedback effects from stock 
prices to firms’ real investment decisions. Several strands of literature support this price 
efficiency channel. First, existing theoretical and empirical papers establish a 
significant link between the stock market and real sector activity, confirming that 
managers do learn and glean information contained in stock prices that they may not 
otherwise possess when making value-enhancing corporate investment decisions (see 
the survey paper by Bond et al. 2012 and references cited therein). In general, these 
studies find that informative prices help firms to efficiently allocate their investment 
resources. Second, the extant theoretical models predict that higher liquidity induces 
more informed trading as the reduced trading costs incentivize traders to acquire more 
private information, thereby making stock prices become more informative (see, for 
example, Kyle, 1985; Easley and O’Hara, 2004). Empirically, the causal relationship 
between liquidity and price efficiency is firmly established by Chordia et al. (2008) and 
Chung and Hrazdil (2010). Third, it is worth noting that the beneficial effects of 
liquidity extend beyond stock price informativeness to firm value. For instance, the 
theoretical model of Edmans (2009) predicts that high liquidity increases the credibility 
of exit threat by blockholders whose informed trading enhances stock price 
informativeness. The latter implies that stock prices efficiently reflect firms’ 
fundamentals, and thus discipline managers with stock-based compensation to 
undertake value-enhancing investments to prevent blockholders from voting with their 
feet.  
 
Returning to the Malaysian stock market, Lim et al. (2016) utilize the ownership dataset 
provided by Bursa Malaysia and examine the informational role of key market 
participants. In sharp contrast to the findings from developed markets, the authors find 
that security analysts and local institutional investors do not play a significant role in 
the information incorporation process. Instead, their extensive analyses show that only 
foreign investors who trade through the nominee accounts accelerate the incorporation 
of common information into the prices of Malaysian stocks, which can be largely 
attributed to their superior skilled analysis of systematic market-wide factors. 
Motivated by the unique finding that foreign nominees are elite processors of public 
news in Bursa Malaysia, we test the following hypothesis in alternative form: 
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H3:  Firms with high foreign nominee ownership require higher level of liquidity 
than those with low foreign nominee ownership in order to reap the benefit of 
larger firm value. 
 
Greater stock liquidity may also operate through better corporate governance in 
deriving higher firm value. Maug (1998) demonstrates theoretically that liquidity 
facilitates formation of large blockholdings at a lower transaction cost, thereby 
enhancing blockholders’ incentives to voice or intervene. Recent theoretical models 
emphasize alternative governance mechanism through the threat of exit, in which 
higher liquidity allows blockholders to dispose their shares easily when they are 
unhappy with firm performance, and thus exerting downward pressure on stock prices 
(see the survey papers by Edmans, 2014 and Edmans and Holderness, 2017). Such 
disciplinary trading is highly effective in aligning managers’ incentives with those of 
outside shareholders when managerial compensation is closely tied to stock prices. In 
a parallel body of literature, recent empirical evidence advocates strengthening 
corporate governance as firms with better practices are found to enjoy higher market 
valuation (see the survey papers of Love, 2011 and Balachandran and Faff, 2015). 
 
A unique feature in the Malaysian corporate landscape is that government-controlled 
institutions hold more than 70% of total local institutional shareholdings – examples 
include the Employees Provident Fund, the Armed Forces Fund Board, the National 
Equity Corporation, the Pilgrimage Fund Board and the Social Security Organization. 
Apart from their social-economic mandates to support national development goals (see 
Lim et al., 2016 and references cited therein), these state-backed local institutional 
funds have been entrusted by the government to spearhead shareholder activism 
through Minority Shareholder’s Watchdog Group (MSWG)6 and the Malaysian Code 
for Institutional Investors.7 Empirically, Abdul Wahab et al. (2007) and Ameer and 
                                                          
6 In response to the 1997/1998 Asian financial crisis, the Malaysian government set up the Finance 
Committee on Corporate Governance (FCCG). One of the FCCG’s key recommendations is to 
institutionalize the monitoring and governance roles of large institutional investors (see 
https://www.sc.com.my/finance-committee-report-on-corporate-governance/, retrieved on 15 February 
2017). This led to the establishment of the Minority Shareholders Watchdog Group (MSWG) in August 
2000 as a government initiative to protect the interests of minority shareholders through shareholder 
activism and promote corporate governance best practices among publicly listed companies. The four 
founding members of MSWG are the Armed Forces Fund Board, the National Equity Corporation, the 
Pilgrimage Fund Board, and the Social Security Organization. Further details on MSWG are available at 
https://www.mswg.org.my/ (retrieved on 15 February 2017). 
7 On 27 June 2014, the Securities Commission and Minority Shareholders Watchdog Group jointly 
launched the Malaysian Code for Institutional Investors, which outlines six broad principles of effective 
stewardship by institutional investors, in particularly promoting best corporate governance practices 
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Abdul Rahman (2009) find that local institutional investors play effective monitoring 
and governance roles among Malaysian public listed firms.    
 
Given the unique corporate governance landscape of Malaysia, we test the following 
hypothesis in alternative form: 
 
H4:  Firms with high local institutional ownership require higher level of liquidity 
than those with low local institutional ownership in order to reap the benefit 
of larger firm value. 
 
3. Measurement of Variables and Specification of Baseline Model 
Because the key objective of this study is to re-examine the direct relationship between 
liquidity and firm value, we provide a brief discussion of all the variables used in the 
main analysis and their respective data sources. Following that, the baseline regression 
model is specified along with the main estimation method. A complete list of all 
variables used in this study are provided in the Appendix.  
 
3.1 Dependent variable of firm value 
In the extant literature on liquidity-firm value, the latter is consistently proxied by the 
forward-looking Tobin’s Q, which measures the market valuation of a firm’s assets 
relative to their replacement cost, with a value greater than unity indicating that the firm 
has an incentive to make additional capital investment and thus signaling higher future 
growth opportunities. We follow Fang et al. (2009) in defining Tobin’s Q as the market 
value of assets scaled by the book value of assets, where the numerator in the formula 
is computed as the market value of common equity plus the book value of assets minus 
the sum of the book value of common equity and balance sheet deferred taxes. The 
year-end data for all the four readily available balance sheet items are sourced from 
Thomson Datastream.  
 
3.2 Key independent variable of stock liquidity 
Although liquidity cannot be directly observed, the literature provides hundreds of 
proxies at different data frequencies due to its multifaceted nature. In recent years, it 
                                                          
among their investee companies. The Code can be downloaded from https://www.sc.com.my/wp-
content/uploads/eng/html/cg/mcii_140627.pdf (retrieved on 15 February 2017). 
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has become standard practice for U.S. firm-level studies to measure liquidity using 
transaction data of bid-ask spreads from the Trades and Quotes (TAQ) database. 
Unfortunately, accessibility to such high frequency data for emerging markets is a very 
recent development through Thomson Reuters Tick History (TRTH), but accessing this 
database requires enormous computational time and high subscription costs, as 
highlighted by Fong et al. (2017). Nevertheless, it is still possible to construct bid-ask 
spreads using daily data (see Corwin and Schultz, 2012; Chung and Zhang, 2014). 
 
To select the best proxy among the many choices, liquidity horseraces provide useful 
guides to researchers as the exercises assess the correlations of low frequency liquidity 
proxies with their intraday benchmarks (see Lesmond, 2005; Goyenko et al., 2009; 
Marshall et al, 2013; Fong et al., 2017). For Malaysian stocks, Fong et al. (2017) 
recommend the “Closing Percent Quoted Spread” (CPQS) developed by Chung and 
Zhang (2014) as it is the best performer among the ten shortlisted percent-cost liquidity 
proxies, outperforming its closest competitor by large margins at both the daily and 
monthly intervals.8 
 
The CPQS for stock i  on day d can be written as: 
 
 
100   x  
2Bid ClosingAsk Closing
Bid Closing Ask Closing
,,
,,
,
didi
didi
diCPQS


            (1)                                     
 
where di,Ask Closing  and di,Bid Closing are respectively the closing ask and bid prices 
of stock i on day d, and the multiplication by 100 is for scaling purpose. The daily 
CPQS measure, which represents the cost an investor must incur to trade immediately, 
is computed using the closing bid and ask prices sourced from Thomson Datastream. 
These daily estimates are then averaged to obtain the liquidity measures for each year 
and each individual Malaysian stock. A higher value for CPQS indicates a wider spread 
and thus higher trading cost, suggesting that CPQS is an inverse measure of liquidity. 
 
                                                          
8 Our selection of CPQS is based on the liquidity horserace conducted by Fong et al. (2017), who 
assemble 189 million trades and 90 million quotes for 960 Malaysian stocks over 12-year sample period 
from January 1996 to December 2007. At the monthly interval, Fong et al. (2017) show that CPQS 
outperforms its closest competitor by margins of 57% in the cross-sectional dimension, 28% in the 
portfolio time-series dimension and 105% in the individual stock time-series dimension. At the daily 
interval, CPQS again emerges as the best liquidity proxy for the Malaysian stocks, outperforms the 
“High-Low” bid-ask spread by Corwin and Schultz (2012). 
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3.3 Control variables 
The empirical finance literature has long explored the determinants of firm value, and 
we thus control for those standard factors in order to isolate the independent effect of 
liquidity. Our list of control variables is divided into firm and board characteristics, 
with their definitions provided in the Appendix.  
 
In the first group of firm variables where the year-end data are sourced from Thomson 
Datastream, we have firm size (SIZE), firm age (AGE), financial leverage (LEV), annual 
sales growth (SALES), capital expenditure (CAPEX), return volatility (VOL), return on 
assets (ROA), and index membership (KLCI). To control for board characteristics, we 
hand-collect four variables from the annual reports of publicly listed firms, which are 
available on the website of Bursa Malaysia:9 (1) total number of directors on the board 
(BSIZE); (2) the proportion of independent non-executive directors (BINDEP), which 
should have at least one-third of the board as mandated by the Bursa Malaysia Listing 
Requirements; (3) CEO duality (DUAL), in which the positions of board chairman and 
chief executive officer are to be held by the same individual; (4) the board chairman is 
an independent non-executive director (CHAIR), which is a more stringent measure of 
board independence.   
 
3.4 Specification of baseline model 
The pioneering paper by Fang et al. (2009) specifies a linear regression model with all 
contemporaneous variables. To accommodate the possibility of a nonlinear relationship 
between liquidity and firm value in line with hypothesis H1, we extend their 
specification by including a quadratic term for the liquidity variable to form our 
baseline model: 
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           (2) 
                                                          
 9 The annual reports for all listed companies are publicly available on the Bursa Malaysia website for 
2000 forward. The URL link is http://www.bursamalaysia.com/market/listed-companies/company-
announcements/ (last retrieved on 30 May 2016). 
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ln  refers to natural logarithm, and all variables are defined in the Appendix.  jIND  is 
a vector of industry-specific dummy variables constructed based on the sector 
classification of Bursa Malaysia to control for time-invariant industry effects, where 
1jIND if firm i is in industry j and 0 otherwise, and J is the number of industries. Year 
dummies tYR  are included to control for common shocks, where 1tYR if firm i is in 
year t and 0 otherwise, and T is the number of years. A nonlinear relationship between 
liquidity and firm value requires statistically significant coefficients with opposite signs 
for 1  and .2  To ensure valid statistical inferences for pooled OLS, we follow the 
recommendations of Petersen (2009) to account for the likely presence of within-cluster 
correlations.10 
 
4. The Sample 
We first discuss how the sample firms are selected for data collection. Subsequently, 
descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for the sample data are provided.11  
 
4.1 Sample firms 
We obtain from Bursa Malaysia the list of stocks that were traded at the end of each 
calendar year for the sample period 2000–2015, and the list is therefore free from 
survivorship bias; however, Thomson Datastream only provides data for stocks that are 
still active at the point of retrieval. For stocks that have been delisted, their historical 
data must be downloaded from the list of “Dead Stocks” in Thomson Datastream. We 
include both dead and active stocks on Bursa Malaysia, given that survivorship bias is 
of primary concern to firm performance studies. Nevertheless, we exclude financial 
firms because the Malaysian financial system is governed under a different regulatory 
and supervisory framework set up by the Central Bank of Malaysia. The final sample 
covers 1250 Malaysian publicly listed firms over the 16-year period, with the number 
of firm-year observations varies for each variable in our unbalanced panel. All 
                                                          
10 Petersen (2009) and Gow et al. (2010) demonstrate that when within-cluster correlations are not 
properly accounted for, the OLS estimator produces biased standard errors. Throughout this paper, all 
the regressions are estimated using White heteroscedastic-robust, firm-clustered, time-clustered, and 
double-clustered standard errors. To conserve space, however, we mostly report double-clustered 
standard errors.  
11 The descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for the two moderating variables, political connections 
(PCON) and ownership level (OWN), are not reported to conserve space but are available upon request 
from the authors. It is worth highlighting that the correlation coefficients for the three PCON and six 
OWN variables with other regressors are relatively low, the highest being 0.4380. 
 
16 
 
continuous variables, with the exception of dummies, are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles to reduce the influence of outliers.  
 
4.2 Sample data 
After the sample selection, we collect data for the 1250 Malaysian publicly listed firms. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables in the baseline quadratic 
model (2). Turning to our key variable of interest,  the mean of Tobin’s Q for Malaysian 
stocks is 1.1388, which is slightly lower than the average firm value of 1.828 for U.S. 
stocks reported by Fang et al. (2009). The average CPQS is 5.3370, higher than the 
mean CPQS of 2.5 in Fong et al. (2017) for 960 Malaysian stocks over the sample 
period 1996–2007. Since CPQS is an inverse measure of liquidity, the higher value 
indicates that our sample stocks are relatively illiquid, partly due to the inclusion of 
additional 290 firms (mostly delisted) and data after the global financial crisis. 
  
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Standard 
Deviation 
N 
 
Q 1.1388 0.9267 0.3923 5.6492 0.7796 13479 
CPQS 5.3370 2.7051 0.4656 44.2728 7.2572 13827 
SIZE 1050911 246614 7519 20700000 2794410 14464 
AGE 21.6347 17.0000 0.0000 92.0000 17.4876 18655 
LEV 0.2355 0.1872 0.0000 1.6470 0.2518 14441 
SALES 13.5744 5.8350 -82.4100 351.3900 54.6952 13848 
CAPEX 0.0403 0.0219 0.0000 0.2748 0.0509 14014 
VOL 3.5105 2.9221 0.7429 13.7523 2.2864 14034 
ROA 0.0271 0.0372 -0.5760 0.3113 0.1171 14393 
KLCI 0.0500 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.2179 20161 
BSIZE 7.4992 7.0000 4.0000 14.0000 2.0055 13941 
BINDEP 0.4258 0.4000 0.1667 0.8000 0.1258 13941 
DUAL 0.0449 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.2071 13941 
CHAIR 0.3391 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4734 13941 
       
Notes:  The definitions for all the variables are provided in the Appendix. This table presents the 
descriptive statistics for all the variables in the baseline quadratic model (2). Instead of taking 
natural logarithm, we report firm size (in Ringgit Malaysia), firm age (year) and board size 
(number) in the original unit for ease of interpretation. All the continuous variables, with the 
exception of the three dummies (KLCI, DUAL, CHAIR), are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles to reduce the influence of outliers. N denotes the number of firm-year observations.  
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
Variable Q CPQS ln SIZE ln AGE LEV 
Q 1.0000     
CPQS -0.1069 1.0000    
ln SIZE -0.0675 -0.4350 1.0000   
ln AGE -0.0838 -0.0901 0.3450 1.0000  
LEV 0.0645 0.0719 0.1563 0.0336 1.0000 
SALES  0.0415 -0.0726 0.0334 -0.0790 -0.0397 
CAPEX 0.1083 -0.1153 0.0356 -0.1630 -0.0172 
VOL -0.0381 0.6782 -0.4638 -0.1486 0.2417 
ROA 0.1402 -0.2760 0.2448 -0.0212 -0.3130 
KLCI 0.1416 -0.1641 0.4486 0.1439 0.0236 
ln BSIZE 0.0097 -0.1631 0.3295 0.0618 -0.0211 
BINDEP -0.0066 0.0558 -0.0361 0.1006 0.0065 
DUAL -0.0029 -0.0296 0.0462 0.0186 0.0037 
CHAIR 0.0703 -0.0043 -0.0173 0.0136 -0.0039 
 SALES CAPEX VOL ROA KLCI 
SALES  1.0000     
CAPEX 0.0634 1.0000    
VOL -0.0583 -0.1534 1.0000   
ROA 0.2000 0.1573 -0.4544 1.0000  
KLCI -0.0111 0.0483 -0.1834 0.1218 1.0000 
ln BSIZE 0.0250 0.0742 -0.2531 0.1643 0.1893 
BINDEP -0.0304 -0.0399 0.1013 -0.1187 -0.0593 
DUAL 0.0032 0.0176 -0.0027 0.0016 0.0354 
CHAIR 0.0039 0.0113 -0.0037 0.0129 -0.0088 
 ln BSIZE BINDEP DUAL CHAIR  
ln BSIZE 1.0000     
BINDEP -0.3636 1.0000    
DUAL -0.0725 0.0369 1.0000   
CHAIR -0.0230 0.2162 -0.1570 1.0000   
Notes:  The definitions for all the variables are provided in the Appendix. This table presents the Pearson 
correlations between pairs of variables in the baseline quadratic model (2).  
 
 
Following the common practice, Table 2 presents the correlation matrix for the 
variables in the baseline quadratic model. The correlation between the explanatory 
variables and Tobin’s Q provides a preliminary view of their univariate relationship. 
All the control variables have the expected relationship, with the sole exception of 
board independence (BINDEP). Turning to the key variable of interest, CPQS is 
negatively correlated with Tobin’s Q, consistent with the consensus in the empirical 
literature. We, however, postulate that the liquidity-firm value relationship is nonlinear. 
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The correlation coefficients between explanatory variables are not highly correlated, 
downplaying the concern of collinearity plaguing our regression analysis. We further 
compute the Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) for all independent variables in the 
baseline quadratic model (2), but not reported to conserve space. All the independent 
variables have low VIFs (highest being 2.49), with the exception of CPQS (7.99) and 
CPQS2 (10.24). The latter is inevitable as the quadratic variable is derived from CPQS 
and both are included in the same model. Although multicollinearity is present due to 
the inclusion of quadratic variable, the issue is not of major concern as the inflated 
standard error of its coefficient does not undermine the statistical significance.  
 
5. Non-linear Relationship between Liquidity and Firm Value 
In this section, we empirically test hypothesis H1 to determine the existence of a 
nonlinear relationship between liquidity and firm value. The baseline model is first 
examined using pooled OLS, and then subjected to a battery of robustness checks to 
ensure reliable statistical inference.  
 
5.1 Baseline results 
The results for the baseline model (2) are presented in Table 3. Heeding the 
recommendations of Petersen (2009), we accommodate the possible existence of 
within-cluster correlations by estimating all regressions using White heteroscedastic-
robust, firm-clustered, time-clustered, and double-clustered standard errors. To 
conserve space, only White- and double-clustered standard errors are reported, but the 
statistical inferences take into account the existence of within-cluster correlations by 
comparing all four adjustments. 
 
For comparison with the extant literature, in particular the pioneering work of Fang et 
al. (2009), we also specify a linear relationship between liquidity and firm value, and 
the result of the linear model is presented in Table 3. Consistent with the consensus of 
the literature, the coefficient of CPQS is negative and significant at the l% level. 
Because CPQS is an inverse measure of liquidity, the significant result implies that 
higher stock liquidity correlates with larger firm value. Moving to the quadratic model 
(2), the first-order CPQS retains its negative and significant coefficient, whereas its 
squared term is positively and significantly associated with Tobin’s Q. This supports 
hypothesis H1 and contradicts the widely documented positive linear relationship 
between liquidity and firm value. Our finding of a U-shaped curve suggests that when 
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liquidity is at lower levels, liquidity and firm value are negatively related, but the 
relationship turns positive when liquidity increases and exceeds a certain threshold 
level.12 Although our result supports the firm value benefit of higher liquidity, we 
highlight that such benefit can only be attained after firms reach the threshold level of 
liquidity. This also offers plausible explanations as to why not all firms pursue liquidity-
enhancing policies despite the obvious valuation premium, since the potential costs of 
maintaining high level of liquidity might outweigh the associated benefits. The 
empirical result also reiterates the importance of functional form, showing that a linear 
model might yield incorrect inferences when the relationship is driven by competing 
channels with opposing effects.  
 
Turning to the control variables in the quadratic model (2), only six regressors are 
revealed to be statistically significant across all the four robust standard errors: (1) firm 
size (SIZE), with the negative coefficient suggesting that larger Malaysian firms on 
average report lower firm value, which could be due to operational inefficiencies and 
costlier monitoring; (2) higher leverage (LEV) is found to correlate with a larger Tobin’s 
Q, reflecting the monitoring benefit or tax savings of debt obligations; (3) capital 
expenditures (CAPEX) are positively and significantly associated with firm value, as 
investors highly value those firms that invest for future growth; (4) profitability as 
reflected by higher return on assets (ROA) effectively translates into larger market 
valuation; (5) greater visibility generated by the inclusion in Bursa Malaysia key stock 
market index (KLCI) yields significant value benefit; and (6) the new dummy variable 
of CHAIR, which takes a value of one if the board chairman is an independent non-
executive director, is the only significant corporate governance variable that correlates 
positively with firm value. In contrast, the explanatory power of the widely used 
empirical proxies – BSIZE, BINDEP and DUAL – have largely been subsumed. This 
implies that having a larger board size, more independent non-executive directors, and 
separate CEO and board chairmen are no longer sufficient. Instead, a more stringent 
corporate governance code must be applied for Malaysian publicly listed firms to 
deliver higher market valuations.  
 
 
 
                                                          
12 The threshold liquidity level can be computed using the estimated coefficients of CPQS and CPQS2 in 
the baseline quadratic model (2), i.e., 
21/2γγ , which yields a value of 24.1786. 
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Table 3: Liquidity and Firm Value 
 
Linear Model 
 
Quadratic Model 
 
White 
Double-
Clustered 
 
White 
Double- 
Clustered 
CPQS -0.0145*** -0.0145***  -0.0677*** -0.0677*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0032)  (0.0032) (0.0072) 
CPQS2    0.0014*** 0.0014*** 
    (0.0001) (0.0002) 
ln SIZE -0.1431*** -0.1431***  -0.1824*** -0.1824*** 
 (0.0096) (0.0278)  (0.0100) (0.0268) 
ln AGE -0.0001 -0.0001  0.0061 0.0061 
 (0.0107) (0.0278)  (0.0106) (0.0274) 
LEV 0.6714*** 0.6714***  0.7115*** 0.7115*** 
 (0.0609) (0.1271)  (0.0582) (0.1220) 
SALES  -0.000004 -0.000004  -0.00004 -0.00004 
 (0.0001) (0.0002)  (0.0001) (0.0002) 
CAPEX 0.8014*** 0.8014***  0.5964*** 0.5964** 
 (0.1445) (0.2879)  (0.1425) (0.2785) 
VOL 0.0109** 0.0109  0.0154*** 0.0154 
 (0.0054) (0.0101)  (0.0053) (0.0110) 
ROA 1.5406*** 1.5406***  1.4343*** 1.4343*** 
 (0.1451) (0.3736)  (0.1401) (0.3507) 
KLCI 0.5756*** 0.5756***  0.5660*** 0.5660*** 
 (0.0367) (0.0993)  (0.0364) (0.1006) 
ln BSIZE 0.0649** 0.0649  0.0679** 0.0679 
 (0.0272) (0.0581)  (0.0266) (0.0558) 
BINDEP 0.0521 0.0521  -0.0086 -0.0086 
 (0.0605) (0.0975)  (0.0588) (0.0959) 
DUAL -0.0417 -0.0417  -0.0400 -0.0400 
 (0.0257) (0.0496)  (0.0248) (0.0483) 
CHAIR 0.0744*** 0.0744**  0.0682*** 0.0682** 
 (0.0142) (0.0326)  (0.0139) (0.0319) 
CONSTANT 2.5617*** 2.5617***  3.1606*** 3.1606*** 
 (0.1446) (0.3978)  (0.1484) (0.3755) 
      
Year Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
N 12,349 12,349  12,349 12,349 
Adj. R2 0.1684 0.1684  0.1987 0.1987 
Notes:  The definitions for all the variables are provided in the Appendix. This table presents the OLS 
estimation results for the baseline quadratic model in equation (2) where the dependent variable 
is Tobin’s Q over the sample period 2000-2015, with the linear model added for comparison 
purpose. For brevity, year and industry dummies are suppressed but available upon request. 
Following Petersen (2009), we accommodate the possible existence of within-cluster 
correlations by estimating all regressions using White heteroscedastic-robust, firm-clustered, 
time-clustered, and double-clustered standard errors. To conserve space, only White- and 
double-clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. N denotes the number of firm-year 
observations.  
***
, 
** and 
* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.   
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5.2 Robustness checks  
In this subsection, we perform a series of robustness checks to ensure the reliability of 
our statistical inferences drawn from the baseline quadratic model.  
 
5.2.1 Alternative liquidity measures 
The “Closing Percent Quoted Spread” (CPQS) is selected as our main liquidity measure 
because it is the best performing percent-cost proxy for Malaysian stocks and captures 
an important dimension of liquidity: the transaction cost incurred by investors to trade 
immediately. Another liquidity dimension that is widely considered in the literature, 
however, is the price impact, in which the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio is accepted 
as the standard proxy in empirical finance research (see Lou and Shu, 2017). For 
Malaysian stocks, the horserace conducted by Fong et al. (2017) finds that the price 
impact version of CPQS performs best at the monthly frequency, and as well as the 
Amihud illiquidity ratio at the daily interval.  
 
In view of the above development, we consider two price impact measures: (1) CPQS 
Impact (hereafter referred to as CPQSIM), which is the daily ratio of the CPQS scaled 
by local currency trading volume; and (2) Amihud illiquidity ratio (hereafter referred 
to as ILLIQ), which is computed as the daily ratio of the absolute stock returns to the 
local currency trading volume. In both cases, the annual liquidity estimates for each 
stock are obtained by averaging the computed daily ratios across all trading days for 
each calendar year. Similar to the case of CPQS, the two price impact proxies are 
inverse measures of liquidity, where higher value indicates a greater degree of 
illiquidity. The required daily data are all sourced from Thomson Datastream. 
 
We re-estimate the baseline quadratic model (2) using the two price impact measures, 
and the results are presented in Table 4. While the linear model shows that liquidity and 
firm value are positively associated, the significance of liquidity and squared liquidity 
variables lends further credence to our baseline result that their relationship is nonlinear. 
The consistent results across the two key liquidity dimensions suggest that strategies 
aimed at lowering transaction cost and price impact are of equal importance in 
delivering higher firm value. The value gains will only be realized, however, when 
liquidity exceeds their respective threshold levels. Among the firm characteristics, 
Tobin’s Q is higher for firms with fewer total assets, more leverage, larger return on 
assets, and greater visibility with index membership. In terms of board characteristics, 
our results suggest that having a larger board size, more independent non-executive 
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directors, and separate CEO and board chairmen are not sufficient to reap the value 
gains. Instead, it requires a more stringent corporate governance criterion in which an 
independent non-executive director is appointed as the board chairman.  
 
5.2.2 Alternative estimators 
Our main estimator is the pooled OLS with the standard errors adjusted for the existence 
of within-cluster correlations. As a robustness check, we re-estimate the baseline 
quadratic model with Fama-MacBeth two-step regression and quantile regression. The 
first estimator is designed to pick up cross-sectional effects as the procedure involves 
estimating cross-sectional regression for each year separately, and then inferences are 
drawn from the time-series averages of the estimated coefficients. Quantile regression, 
developed by Koenker and Bassett (1978), addresses the shortcomings of OLS 
regression that estimates the conditional mean effect of liquidity on firm value, and the 
potential bias arises from the non-normality of our dependent variable. More 
specifically, the advantage of quantile regression lies in its ability to discern the effects 
of liquidity along the entire range of the firm value conditional distribution, especially 
at the extreme upper and lower tails (for a survey, see Koenker and Hallock, 2001).  
 
The regression results for the baseline model using these two alternative estimators are 
presented in Table 5. In the first column, the Fama-MacBeth regression does not affect 
the signs and statistical significance of our key variables of liquidity and squared 
liquidity. We then present the regression estimates at the 0.10th, 0.25th, 0.50th, 0.75th and 
0.90th quantiles of the firm value conditional distribution. The coefficients for CPQS 
and CPQS2 are consistently highly significant with the signs remaining unaffected 
across the five representative quantiles, suggesting the widespread influence of 
liquidity on all firms.13 Only the magnitudes of the coefficients vary considerably, 
gradually increasing as we move from lower to higher firm value quantiles. This 
indicates that the effect of liquidity is more pronounced for firms with higher Tobin’s 
Q, strengthening our interpretation of the documented U-shaped relationship where the 
value benefit can only be attained when liquidity is high and exceeds a certain threshold 
level.  
 
                                                          
13 To visualize the effects for all quantiles, we plot the coefficients for CPQS and CPQS2 with their 
corresponding 95% confidence intervals against the entire conditional distribution of Tobin’s Q. The 
quantile-varying CPQS estimates depict clear downward trend, whereas the estimates for CPQS2 slope 
upward as we move from lower to higher quantiles. More importantly, all the coefficients are statistically 
significant as their corresponding 95% confidence intervals do not overlap with the zero value. The 
figures are not presented here to conserve space, but are available upon request from the authors.  
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Table 4 
Robustness Check with Alternative Liquidity Measures 
 ILLIQ  CPQSIM 
   Linear  
  Model 
Quadratic 
   Model  
   Linear  
  Model 
Quadratic 
   Model 
PIMPACT -0.1637*** -0.3948***  -0.1375*** -0.3131*** 
 (0.0099) (0.0316)  (0.0080) (0.0251) 
PIMPACT2  0.0259***   0.0255*** 
  (0.0029)   (0.0030) 
ln SIZE -0.2645*** -0.3005***  -0.2311*** -0.2607*** 
 (0.0283) (0.0272)  (0.0275) (0.0268) 
ln AGE 0.0044 0.0176  0.0096 0.0157 
 (0.0250) (0.0245)  (0.0250) (0.0245) 
LEV 0.7947*** 0.8135***  0.7046*** 0.7334*** 
 (0.1373) (0.1285)  (0.1176) (0.1136) 
SALES -0.0001 -0.0001  -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.0002) (0.0002)  (0.0002) (0.0002) 
CAPEX 0.3632 0.2618  0.4316 0.3442 
 (0.2787) (0.2714)  (0.2785) (0.2717) 
VOL 0.0313*** -0.0187**  0.0274*** -0.0134 
 (0.0075) (0.0081)  (0.0087) (0.0090) 
ROA 1.3614*** 1.2828***  1.5633*** 1.4784*** 
 (0.3280) (0.3148)  (0.3228) (0.3099) 
KLCI 0.4837*** 0.3579***  0.5058*** 0.4300*** 
 (0.0955) (0.0819)  (0.0999) (0.0942) 
ln BSIZE 0.0712 0.0448  0.0702 0.0523 
 (0.0516) (0.0508)  (0.0541) (0.0534) 
BINDEP -0.0771 -0.0848  -0.1180 -0.1246 
 (0.0910) (0.0859)  (0.0932) (0.0890) 
DUAL -0.0452 -0.0300  -0.0424 -0.0333 
 (0.0481) (0.0457)  (0.0487) (0.0474) 
CHAIR 0.0561* 0.0614**  0.0615** 0.0636** 
 (0.0312) (0.0302)  (0.0308) (0.0298) 
CONSTANT 4.7113*** 5.7996***  3.6821*** 4.1825*** 
 (0.4258) (0.4409)  (0.3778) (0.3684) 
      
Year 
Industry 
   Yes 
   Yes 
   Yes 
   Yes 
    Yes 
   Yes 
   Yes 
   Yes 
N 11,794 11,794  11,650 11,650 
Adj. R2 0.2773 0.3072  0.2501 0.2719 
Notes:  The definitions for all the variables are provided in the Appendix. This table presents the OLS 
estimation results for the baseline quadratic model in equation (2) where the dependent variable 
is Tobin’s Q over the sample period 2000-2015, but replaces CPQS with two alternative price 
impact measures for the variable PIMPACT – the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio (ILLIQ) and 
the price impact version of CPQS (CPQSIM). For brevity, year and industry dummies are 
suppressed but available upon request. Double-clustered standard errors are reported in the 
parentheses. N denotes the number of firm-year observations.  
***
, 
** and 
* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.   
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Table 5 
Robustness Check with Alternative Estimators 
 
Fama- 
MacBeth 
Quantile Regression 
 
     10th       25th       50th       75th      90th 
CPQS -0.0754*** -0.0167*** -0.0218*** -0.0310*** -0.0554*** -0.0990*** 
 (0.0071) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0017) (0.0029) (0.0071) 
CPQS2 0.0021*** 0.0003*** 0.0004*** 0.0006*** 0.0012*** 0.0024*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
ln SIZE -0.1956*** -0.0488*** -0.0451*** -0.0543*** -0.1082*** -0.2270*** 
 (0.0205) (0.0039) (0.0041) (0.0046) (0.0068) (0.0182) 
ln AGE 0.0154 -0.0149*** -0.0193*** -0.0250*** -0.0275*** -0.0012 
 (0.0156) (0.0036) (0.0040) (0.0059) (0.0091) (0.0211) 
LEV 0.5286*** 0.5816*** 0.4843*** 0.4055*** 0.4687*** 0.7800*** 
 (0.0786) (0.0141) (0.0165) (0.0248) (0.0502) (0.1025) 
SALES  -0.0001 0.0002*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0002* -0.0001 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
CAPEX 0.5432** 0.2378*** 0.2719*** 0.4669*** 0.7568*** 0.8074*** 
 (0.2119) (0.0467) (0.0464) (0.0870) (0.1674) (0.2192) 
VOL 0.0174 -0.0036** 0.0023 0.0090*** 0.0148*** 0.0123 
 (0.0103) (0.0016) (0.0020) (0.0035) (0.0052) (0.0084) 
ROA 1.4425*** 0.5357*** 0.6096*** 0.6775*** 0.8280*** 1.4777*** 
 (0.2251) (0.0576) (0.0618) (0.0651) (0.1138) (0.1602) 
KLCI 0.7616*** 0.1057*** 0.1371*** 0.2314*** 0.5216*** 0.9876*** 
 (0.0712) (0.0124) (0.0131) (0.0199) (0.0366) (0.1192) 
ln BSIZE 0.0924** 0.0561*** 0.0602*** 0.0502*** 0.0843*** 0.0962* 
 (0.0343) (0.0087) (0.0108) (0.0150) (0.0269) (0.0537) 
BINDEP 0.0337 -0.0231 -0.0509** -0.0433 0.0019 0.1188 
 (0.0356) (0.0261) (0.0238) (0.0277) (0.0528) (0.1354) 
DUAL -0.0352 -0.0304* -0.0195 0.0071 0.0118 -0.0333 
 (0.0276) (0.0163) (0.0154) (0.0138) (0.0221) (0.0614) 
CHAIR 0.0627*** 0.0135*** 0.0147*** 0.0132* 0.0629*** 0.1254*** 
 (0.0158) (0.0038) (0.0056) (0.0070) (0.0152) (0.0318) 
CONSTANT 3.1802*** 1.2285*** 1.2502*** 1.5238*** 2.2858*** 3.8612*** 
 (0.3733) (0.0747) (0.0828) (0.0912) (0.1345) (0.3239) 
       
Year    No     Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes 
Industry    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes 
N 12,349 12,349 12,349 12,349 12,349 12,349 
R2/Pseudo R2 0.2795 0.1514 0.1177 0.0957 0.1177 0.1690 
Notes:  The definitions for all the variables are provided in the Appendix. This table presents the 
estimation results for the baseline quadratic model in equation (2) where the dependent variable 
is Tobin’s Q over the sample period 2000-2015, but replaces pooled OLS estimator with Fama-
MacBeth two-step regression and quantile regression. For brevity, year and industry dummies 
are suppressed but available upon request. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. N 
denotes the number of firm-year observations.  
***
, 
** and 
* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.   
 
The quantile regression results also demonstrate considerable heterogeneity in the 
relationship between firm value and the control variables. For instance, variables that 
have been found to be insignificant in the baseline OLS regression are now becoming 
statistically significant in the quantile analysis, such as firm age (AGE), annual sales 
growth (SALES), return volatility (VOL) and board size (BSIZE). While these variables 
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appear unimportant for average firms, they are significant determinants for firms 
located at different quantiles of the Tobin’s Q distribution. On the other hand, firm size 
(SIZE), leverage (LEV), capital expenditures (CAPEX), return on assets (ROA), stock 
index membership (KLCI) and independent non-executive chairman (CHAIR) are 
crucial drivers for firm value as they remain highly significant across different 
estimators: pooled OLS, Fama-MacBeth regression and quantile analysis.  
 
5.2.3 Confirming the U-shape relationship 
The baseline quadratic results support our hypothesis that stock liquidity and firm value 
are nonlinearly associated, with the signs consistent with a U-shaped relationship. Lind 
and Mehlum (2010) argue, however, that the statistically significant coefficients with 
opposite signs for CPQS and CPQS2 might erroneously yield a U-shape when the true 
relationship is convex but monotone over relevant data values. These authors then 
propose a formal U-test that gives not only the exact necessary and sufficient conditions 
in finite samples but also the confidence intervals for the threshold point. Table 6 
presents the results of the formal U-test, which is a joint test on the two null hypotheses 
of an inverted-U or monotone relationship. The test statistic rejects the combined null 
hypotheses at the 1% level of significance in favor of a U-shaped relationship with an 
estimated threshold level of 24.73, which is within the upper and lower bounds of 
[23.6621, 25.9548]. The table also shows that the illiquidity-firm value curve has a 
negative and statistically significant slope before the threshold level, but becomes 
upward sloping after reaching the minimum point. This implies that firms must achieve 
higher level of liquidity before reaping the benefit of larger firm value.  
 
 
Table 6: Robustness Check with the Formal Statistical Test for U-Shape 
 Dependent Variable 
 Q 
Slope at Lower Bound -0.0712 (0.0000) 
Slope at Upper Bound 0.0574 (0.0000) 
Lind and Mehlum (2010) Test for U-Shape 13.11 (0.0000) 
Threshold Point 24.7300 
Fieller 95% Confidence Interval [23.6621, 25.9548] 
Notes:  This table presents the estimation results for the U-test on the baseline quadratic model in 
equation (2), which is a joint test on the two null hypotheses of an inverted-U or monotone 
relationship. Entries in parentheses indicate p-values.  
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5.2.4 Excluding the crisis years of 2008-2009 
In an exclusive study on the Malaysian stock market, Liew et al. (2016) report a huge 
drop in the aggregate liquidity of the local bourse during the 2008-2009 global crisis. 
Anecdotal reports also suggest that the market valuations of Malaysian firms were 
severely affected by the crisis. To address the above concern, we re-estimate the 
quadratic model for three sub-periods: (i) 2000-2007 (before crisis); (ii) 2010-2015 
(after crisis); (iii) 2000-2015 but excluding the crisis years of 2008-2009. Table 7 shows 
that our baseline results remain intact across all three columns, with the coefficients for 
liquidity and squared liquidity remaining highly significant and their signs unaffected. 
It is interesting to note that BSIZE, DUAL and CHAIR are only significant in the sub-
period of 2010-2015, suggesting that the crisis has made corporate governance an 
important driver of firm market valuations.  
 
5.2.5 Industry-specific regressions 
Our sample consists of non-financial firms from a large number of industries. Thus, it 
is possible that the significant baseline results from pooled sample might be the net 
effect of varying relationships across industries offsetting each other. We re-estimate 
the quadratic model for each industry in the sample including financial sector, but 
exclude those with less than 100 firm-year observations. The within-industry results in 
Table 8 show that the nonlinear relationship between liquidity and firm value is 
widespread across industries, with the exception of the financial sector, which we 
exclude in the original sample, and hence challenge the conjecture of Cheung et al. 
(2015) that the value gain of higher liquidity is more pronounced in the real estate 
investment trust industry.  
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Table 7 
Robustness Check with the Exclusion of Crisis Years 
 2000-2007 
(Before Crisis) 
2010-2015 
(After Crisis) 
2000-2015 
(Excludes 2008-2009) 
CPQS -0.1268*** -0.0850*** -0.1010*** 
 (0.0155) (0.0091) (0.0095) 
CPQS2 0.0054*** 0.0020*** 0.0030*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
ln SIZE -0.2690*** -0.1252*** -0.1955*** 
 (0.0346) (0.0210) (0.0278) 
ln AGE 0.0285 0.0031 0.0142 
 (0.0378) (0.0286) (0.0289) 
LEV 0.8960*** 0.1288 0.7625*** 
 (0.1004) (0.1033) (0.1302) 
SALES  0.0002 -0.0005*** -0.0001 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
CAPEX -0.0534 1.2103** 0.5462* 
 (0.2369) (0.4932) (0.3042) 
VOL 0.0068 0.0415*** 0.0232* 
 (0.0157) (0.0113) (0.0126) 
ROA 1.4936*** 2.0184*** 1.6600*** 
 (0.3297) (0.4189) (0.3426) 
KLCI 0.5820*** 1.0598*** 0.5823*** 
 (0.1093) (0.1951) (0.1161) 
ln BSIZE -0.0453 0.2316*** 0.0486 
 (0.0493) (0.0750) (0.0570) 
BINDEP 0.0113 0.0080 -0.0357 
 (0.1202) (0.1342) (0.0958) 
DUAL 0.0202 -0.1352** -0.0411 
 (0.0722) (0.0568) (0.0523) 
CHAIR 0.0402 0.1002*** 0.0650** 
 (0.0408) (0.0367) (0.0330) 
CONSTANT 4.5108*** 1.4806*** 3.3944*** 
 (0.4331) (0.2977) (0.3891) 
    
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
N 5,887 4,704 10,591 
Adj. R2 0.2613 0.2768 0.2101 
Notes:  The definitions for all the variables are provided in the Appendix. This table presents the OLS 
estimation results for the baseline quadratic model in equation (2) where the dependent variable 
is Tobin’s Q over sample periods that exclude the crisis years of 2008-2009. For brevity, year 
and industry dummies are suppressed but available upon request. Double-clustered standard 
errors are reported in the parentheses. N denotes the number of firm-year observations.  
***
, 
** and 
* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
28 
 
Table 8: Liquidity-Firm Value Relationship by Industry 
  Industry CPQS CPQS2 N 
Adjusted 
R2 
Construction -0.0472*** 0.0014*** 
730 0.3490 
 (0.0170) (0.0004) 
Consumer Products -0.0650*** 0.0014*** 
1870 0.3378 
 (0.0117) (0.0002) 
Finance -0.0517 0.0028 
623 0.0893 
 (0.0416) (0.0025) 
Industrial Products -0.0553*** 0.0010*** 
3813 0.1578 
 (0.0087) (0.0002) 
Plantation -0.1187** 0.0078*** 
632 0.2180 
 (0.0493) (0.0024) 
Properties -0.0220*** 0.0005*** 
1311 0.1669 
 (0.0078) (0.0002) 
Real Estate Investment Trusts -0.0656** 0.0086* 
110 0.8412 
 (0.0327) (0.0045) 
Technology -0.1475*** 0.0028*** 
1020 0.2427 
 (0.0230) (0.0005) 
Trading/Services -0.0718*** 0.0016*** 
2659 0.1971 
 (0.0147) (0.0004) 
Notes:  This table presents the OLS estimation results for the baseline quadratic model in equation (2) 
where the dependent variable is Tobin’s Q over the sample period 2000-2015, for industries 
with firm-year observations greater than 100. For brevity, estimates for control variables, 
constant and year dummies are suppressed but available upon request. Double-clustered 
standard errors are reported in the parentheses. N denotes the number of firm-year observations.  
***
, 
** and 
* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 
5.2.6 Endogeneity  
We perform a number of robustness checks to address the usual suspect of endogeneity. 
First, we re-estimate the baseline model using one-year lagged explanatory variables 
instead of taking their contemporaneous values (see Bellemare et al., 2017). The results 
in Column (1) from the predictive regression show that our main conclusion on the U-
shaped relationship between liquidity and firm value remains intact. Second, we follow 
Chung et al. (2010) and conduct a change-in-variable regression, where all the 
dependent and continuous independent variables in the baseline model are specified in 
terms of annual changes. The results show that the year-to-year changes in liquidity are 
significantly associated with changes in firm value, reinforcing our main conclusion 
drawn from variables in levels. Third, it is possible that some unobserved time-invariant 
firm characteristics simultaneously determine both liquidity and firm value. To rule out 
the unobserved omitted variable concern, we use the fixed effects approach, which has 
been shown to yield consistent estimates in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity 
(see Gormley and Matsa, 2014). The firm fixed effects estimation results in Column (3) 
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show that the coefficients for liquidity and liquidity squared are still statistically 
significant with the expected signs. It is thus unlikely the documented liquidity-firm 
value relationship is driven by their correlation with common unobservable firm factors. 
Last but not least, a more pertinent concern is the reverse causality from firm value to 
liquidity. Given the difficulty of finding a strictly exogenous external instrument, we 
heed the advice of Wintoki et al. (2012) in using the generalized method-of-moments 
(GMM) dynamic panel framework. The lagged dependent variable of Tobin’s Q is 
added to the right-hand-side of the baseline model, and the resulting dynamic panel 
model is estimated using a two-step system GMM. The results in the last column show 
a causal relationship running from liquidity to firm value.14  
 
5.2.7 Exogenous Liquidity Shock 
To reiterate, the results from using lagged explanatory variables, change-in-variable 
regression, firm fixed effects and dynamic panel GMM estimators indicate that our 
reported nonlinear relationship between liquidity and firm value is not undermined by 
endogeneity. However, the standard in the empirical finance literature to establish 
causal relation is through natural experiments or strictly exogenous experiments.15 For 
instance, Fang et al. (2009) further use the decimalization of tick size in 2001 to identify 
the causal effect from liquidity to firm value, which is now a standard exogenous 
liquidity shock for U.S. studies (see Bharath et al., 2013; Edmans et al., 2013; Fang et 
al., 2014; Cheung et al., 2015; Huang et al., 2017; Dou et al., 2018). Apart from that, 
events that have been used as natural experiments include the 1997 reduction in tick 
size (Fang et al., 2014; Huang et al., 2017), stock splits (Jayaraman and Milbourn, 
2012), analyst coverage terminations (Balakrishnan et al., 2014; Back  et al., 2015) and 
financial crises (Bharath et al., 2013; Dou et al., 2018).  
 
 
 
                                                          
14 The two-step system GMM is implemented in Stata using the xtabond2 command based on the 
recommendations of Roodman (2009a, b). The consistency of the GMM estimator depends on two types 
of specification tests: (1) AR(1) and AR(2) tests are under the null of no first-order and second-order 
serial correlation, respectively, in the first-differenced residuals; (2) Sargan and Hansen tests of over-
identifying restrictions are under the null that all instruments are valid. The regression satisfies the 
specification tests in that there is no evidence of second-order serial correlation, and both the Sargan and 
Hansen tests fail to reject the null that all instruments are valid. The results are not reported to conserve 
space, but are available upon request.  
15  We thank one of the reviewers for this suggestion and the insistence to pursue this additional 
endogeneity test using exogenous liquidity shock, which lends further credence to our claim of causal 
effect from liquidity to firm value.  
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Table 9: Robustness Check on Endogeneity 
 Lag in 
Variables 
(1) 
Changes in 
Variables 
(2) 
Firm Fixed 
Effects 
(3) 
2-Step 
System GMM 
(4) 
CPQS -0.0549*** -0.1853*** -0.0671*** -0.0321*** 
 (0.0051) (0.0289) (0.0028) (0.0100) 
CPQS2 0.0011*** 0.0218*** 0.0014*** 0.0006*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0048) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
ln SIZE -0.1608*** -2.9214*** -0.1805*** -0.2034*** 
 (0.0241) (0.3540) (0.0068) (0.0616) 
ln AGE 0.0248 -0.0612 0.0074 -0.0372 
 (0.0266) (0.0578) (0.0088) (0.1032) 
LEV 0.6543*** 0.0081*** 0.7019*** 2.6202*** 
 (0.1558) (0.0017) (0.0325) (0.3296) 
SALES -0.0004** 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0020* 
 (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0011) 
CAPEX 0.2917 0.0008* 0.5697*** 6.4132*** 
 (0.2689) (0.0005) (0.1279) (2.0880) 
VOL 0.0119 0.0615*** 0.0152*** 0.0284 
 (0.0097) (0.0169) (0.0044) (0.0345) 
ROA 1.3942*** 0.0031*** 1.4295*** 1.2937* 
 (0.3828) (0.0007) (0.0705) (0.7306) 
KLCI 0.5938***  0.5686*** 0.8093** 
 (0.1045)  (0.0261) (0.3984) 
ln BSIZE 0.0287 0.0653 0.0620** 0.4835 
 (0.0572) (0.0557) (0.0263) (0.5272) 
BINDEP -0.0310 0.0184 0.0126 -1.0542 
 (0.0991) (0.0144) (0.0562) (0.8604) 
DUAL -0.0555  -0.0448 -0.5872 
 (0.0468)  (0.0292) (1.0406) 
CHAIR 0.0801**  0.0756*** 0.2297 
 (0.0327)  (0.0131) (0.3274) 
Qt-1    -0.2447
*** 
    (0.0523) 
CONSTANT 2.9211*** -0.0421* 3.4779*** 2.3148* 
 (0.3347) (0.0241) (0.1131) (1.3040) 
     
Year 
Industry 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
N 11,146 9,738 12,349 11,536 
R2 0.1709 0.1608 0.2165  
Notes:  The definitions for all the variables are provided in the Appendix. Columns (1) and (2) present 
the pooled OLS regression results for equation (2) but specify the independent variables in one-
year lagged (t-1) and annual changes (), respectively. Column (3) estimates equation (2) with 
a firm fixed effects estimator, while Column (4) specifies the baseline model as a dynamic panel 
and estimates with two-step system GMM. To conserve space, the coefficients for year and 
industry dummies are not reported. Entries in parentheses are standard errors, with Columns (1) 
& (2) the double-clustered standard errors. N denotes the number of observations.  
***
, 
** and 
* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Unlike the U.S. stock exchanges, there is no reference study for the Malaysian stock 
market in terms of exogenous liquidity shocks. We thus browse through the major 
policies since year 2000 undertaken by Bursa Malaysia with the aim of increasing stock 
liquidity. The reduction of lot size from 1000 units to 100 units in May 2003, which is 
exogenous to corporate financial decisions, appears to be a good candidate to generate 
exogenous variation in liquidity for three reasons.16 First, previous studies from Japan 
show that the reduction in lot size has led to a significant increase in liquidity, especially 
among high-priced stocks. Amihud et al. (1999) and Ahn et al. (2014) find that liquidity 
increases because the reduction in lot size makes high-priced stocks more affordable 
and expands substantially the number of small individual investors. Thus, the increases 
in liquidity induced by this regulatory change vary in the cross-section of stocks. 
Second, the lot size reduction is unlikely to be directly associated with firms’ 
fundamentals such as firm value. Likewise, the probability for the changes in firm value 
to affect liquidity variation generated by the policy change is rather remote. Third, 
several studies caution that the decimalization-induced liquidity shock might be 
overstated as it coincides with Enron scandal, WorldCom fraud, the passage of 
Sarbanes–Oxley Act and the burst of dot-com bubble (see Fang et al., 2014; Huang et 
al., 2017). However, there is no market-wide confounding event surrounding the lot 
size reduction by Bursa Malaysia in 2003.  
 
Thus, we use the lot size reduction in May 2003 as the liquidity-increasing exogenous 
shock, and follow Fang et al. (2009) to augment the baseline quadratic model (2) with 
all the dependent and continuous independent variables specified in terms of changes, 
written as follows: 
      
                                                          
16 In April 2003, the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE, renamed as Bursa Malaysia on 14 April 
2004) commenced standardizing lot size at 100 units in stages for all securities listed on the Main Board, 
Second Board and MESDAQ market. The exercise, fully completed on 26 May 2003, serves to eliminate 
multiple board lots of 100, 200 and 1000 units. In the total 906 stocks listed on KLSE in 2003, all the 32 
MESDAQ stocks were already traded in lot size of 100 units, about 16 blue-chip stocks have been traded 
in lots of 200 units since 1995, while 1000 units are the common lot size for more than 90% of the listed 
stocks. According to the stock exchange, the aim of the lot size standardization is to make the securities 
more accessible and affordable especially to retail investors, and thus improve liquidity. See 
https://www.thestar.com.my/business/business-news/2003/02/01/board-lots-to-be-fixed-at-100/ and 
http://bursa.listedcompany.com/misc/market_review_2002.pdf (retrieved on 31 May 2018). 
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To operationalize equation (3), we compute the changes from the pre-shock year (t –1) 
to the post-shock year (t +1), where t is the calendar year during which the reduction of 
lot size occurred for firm i. Table 10 presents the endogeneity test with exogenous 
liquidity shock, examining the change in Tobin’s Q in response to change in CPQS 
induced by lot size reduction. The OLS estimation results in Column (1) establish that 
the nonlinear relationship between liquidity and firm value is robust to reverse causality, 
with the coefficients for CPQS and CPQS2 are still highly significant and the signs 
consistent with a U-shape. Column (2) considers a narrower measurement window from 
year (t –1) to year t, so as to ensure that the change in liquidity is induced entirely by 
the mandated policy and not confounded by other market-wide events. Again, the 
results confirm the direction of causality running from liquidity to firm value and not 
vice versa.  
 
6. The Moderating Variables in Liquidity-Firm Value Relationship 
After establishing the nonlinear relationship between liquidity and firm value, we 
proceed to explore the variables that are expected to moderate this relationship so as to 
shed light on the underlying channels. 
 
6.1 Political connections 
Given the entrenched culture of state patronage in Malaysian business, we hypothesize 
that politically connected firms require higher level of liquidity than their non-connected 
peers in order to reap the benefit of larger firm value. To test hypothesis H2, we must 
identify firms that have close ties with politicians or political parties in power. Such an 
exercise has been pioneered in the academic literature by Gomez and Jomo (1997), who 
systematically trace the close personal friendships between big business owners and top 
politicians prior to the outbreak of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Their list of 
patronized Malaysian corporations has been updated by Fung et al. (2015), Wong 
(2016) and Tee et al. (2017) up to 2007, 2013 and 2011, respectively. 
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Table 10 
Robustness Check with Exogenous Liquidity Shock 
 2002-2004 
(1) 
2002-2003 
(2) 
CPQS -0.4008*** -0.3451** 
 (0.0811) (0.1437) 
CPQS2 0.0863*** 0.1146* 
 (0.0255) (0.0603) 
ln SIZE -3.3115*** -3.0493*** 
 (0.6646) (0.6579) 
ln AGE 0.1789 0.5568** 
 (0.1802) (0.2298) 
LEV 0.0047*** 0.0024 
 (0.0015) (0.0043) 
SALES  -0.0009 -0.0022** 
 (0.0015) (0.0010) 
CAPEX 0.0037** 0.0074** 
 (0.0018) (0.0032) 
VOL 0.1090*** 0.0412 
 (0.0363) (0.0314) 
ROA 0.0005 0.0047* 
 (0.0025) (0.0025) 
ln BSIZE -0.0838 -0.1141 
 (0.1451) (0.1388) 
BINDEP 0.0164 0.0037 
 (0.0465) (0.0470) 
CONSTANT 0.0892 0.0219 
 (0.1152) (0.0630) 
Year  No No 
Industry Yes Yes 
N 589 600 
Adj. R2 0.1910 0.1153 
Notes:  The definitions for all the variables are provided in the Appendix. This table presents the OLS 
estimation results for equation (3) where the exogenous liquidity shock is the reduction of lot 
size from 1000 to 100 units by the Malaysian stock exchange in May 2003. Column (1) 
computes the changes () from the pre-shock year (t –1) to the post-shock year (t +1), where 
t is the calendar year 2003 during which the reduction of lot size occurred for firm i. Column 
(2) considers a narrower measurement window from year (t –1) to year t. To conserve space, 
the coefficients for industry dummies are not reported. Entries in parentheses are standard 
errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. N denotes the number of observations.  
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively 
 
 
We therefore use these updated lists of connected Malaysian firms in our empirical 
analysis and construct a dummy variable PCON that takes a value of one if a firm is 
politically connected, and zero otherwise. In Fung et al. (2015), PCON firms are those 
that satisfy any of the following criteria: (1) government cabinet members and/or 
members of parliament sit on corporate boards; (2) government or UMNO-linked 
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organizations/individuals hold significant ownership; and (3) managers are politically 
connected individuals. Tee et al. (2017) define a firm as under political patronage if 
one of its controlling shareholders or top officers is a member of parliament, a minister, 
a head of state, or is closely related to a senior cabinet minister. A broader definition is 
used by Wong (2016) to consider four types of political connections that are forged 
through personal friendships between business owners and politicians, former 
government servants serving as board of directors, government-link companies, and 
having immediate family members of leading politicians on corporate boards. The total 
numbers of PCON firms in Fung et al. (2015), Wong (2016) and Tee et al. (2017) are 
122, 256 and 69, respectively. 
 
To test hypothesis H2, we augment the baseline quadratic model with the new dummy 
variable of PCON and its interaction terms with our key variable of liquidity, written 
as follows:  
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The estimation results for equation (4) are presented in Table 11.17 Despite the inclusion 
of PCON in the baseline model, liquidity remains a highly significant determinant of 
firm value across all three columns, with CPQS and CPQS2 retaining their signs of a 
U-shaped relationship. Turning to the dummy variable of PCON, all columns 
consistently show that political connections are positively and significantly associated 
with firm value, lending further support to the existing empirical evidence that firms 
derive value benefit from their close ties with politicians or political parties in power 
(Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Faccio 2006; Goldman et al., 2009). In the Malaysian 
                                                          
17 One of the reviewers rightly points out that equations (4) & (5) suffer from the issue of multicollinearity. 
This is inevitable as the interaction variables are derived from the other explanatory variables that are 
also present in the model. The problem affects only the interaction variables, but not the other explanatory 
variables. While the statistical properties of the estimators are known not to be affected by 
multicollinearity, the standard errors of the estimators could be inflated. Despite the issue, the dummy 
variable for political connection and its interaction with measures of liquidity are significant (Table 11). 
Statistical significance is also found for the ownership variable and its interaction with measures of 
liquidity but this is limited to only foreign ownership (Table 12). Thus, the issue of multicollinearity is 
not of major concern as the inflated standard errors of the coefficients to these variables do not undermine 
their statistical significance.  
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context, anecdotes in the media suggest well-connected firms receive preferential state 
treatment that grants them economic advantages such as lucrative concessions, licenses 
or monopoly rights, favorable regulations, easy access to credit financing, and 
government subsidies. Empirically, Johnson and Mitton (2003) estimate a $60 billion 
loss in market value for their sampled 67 politically connected firms during the early 
phase of the Asian financial crisis from July 1997 to August 1998, largely due to 
market’s perception that the Malaysian government would be unable to continue 
subsidizing them. These authors find evidence, however, that the subsequent imposition 
of capital controls in September 1998 facilitated the government’s financial support of 
patronized firms badly hit by the crisis, resulting in the rebound of their stock prices to 
the tune of a $5 billion gain in market value. The above evidence shows that investors 
generally react positively when firms are under the patronage of top politicians, 
suggesting that the value gains might operate through the stock price channel.   
 
To determine the moderating role of political connections on the liquidity-firm value 
relationship, we turn to the two interaction terms in equation (4). The coefficients for 
CPQSPCON  x  and 
2 x CPQSPCON  are highly significant across all three lists of 
politically connected firms. The turning points suggest that stocks of connected firms 
must be traded at a relatively higher level of liquidity before reaping the value benefit, 
thus lending support to hypothesis H2.
18 While Huang et al. (2014) establish the crucial 
role of investor protection in shaping the liquidity-firm value relationship, we extend 
the literature by showing that the patronage offered by politicians to firms is another 
important institutional determinant. Apart from the stock price channel mentioned 
above, we also highlight the possibility that the moderating role of political connections 
operates through the lower cost of capital. For instance, Houston et al. (2014) report a 
lower cost of bank loans for politically connected firms in the U.S. because lenders 
                                                          
18 In equation (4), the turning point when PCON=0 is 
21/2γγ , whereas PCON = 1 yields a turning point 
of )γ)/2(γγ(γ 172161  . For hypothesis H2 to be true, the turning point for the politically connected 
firms must be smaller (i.e., occurring at higher liquidity) than the turning point for the non-politically 
connected firms. The condition is therefore: 
162γγ > 171γγ . In Table 11, our results show that the 
estimates for 1, 2, 16 and 17 are statistically significant. Taken together, the above condition is met for 
all three separate lists of PCON firms. This indicates that the turning point for the U-shape liquidity-firm 
value curve occurs at a higher liquidity level for PCON=1, thus lending support to hypothesis H2. The 
subsample analysis for PCON and non-PCON firms suggested by both reviewers has been conducted, 
and the unreported results are consistent with the interpretation of our interaction terms (PCON*CPQS 
and PCON*CPQS2) in model (4). 
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perceive them as having high creditworthiness. The cross-country study by Boubakri et 
al. (2012) finds that investors require a lower cost of equity for PCON firms that enjoy 
implicit government guarantee. It is thus possible for political connections to strengthen 
the liquidity-firm value relationship through the cost of capital channel. Because 
identifying the exact mechanism is not central to our study, we leave this unresolved 
issue to future research. 
 
6.2 Investor heterogeneity 
In this section, we utilize the unique finding of Lim et al. (2016) that only foreign 
nominees enhance the price efficiency of Malaysian stocks to provide indirect evidence 
for the stock price informativeness channel via interaction analysis. More specifically, 
hypothesis H3 states that firms with high foreign nominee ownership require higher level 
of liquidity than those with low foreign nominee ownership in order to reap the benefit of 
larger firm value. On the other hand, the unique Malaysian institutional setting whereby 
state-backed local institutional funds have been entrusted by the government to 
spearhead shareholder activism permits us to test the corporate governance channel. 
This leads to hypothesis H4, where firms with high local institutional ownership require 
higher level of liquidity than those with low local institutional ownership in order to reap 
the benefit of larger firm value. 
 
Both hypotheses H3 and H4 require complete ownership data, which are not available 
in existing commercial databases or annual reports of public listed companies. 
Following Lim et al. (2016), we subscribe to the annual ownership dataset “End of Year 
Shareholdings by Type of Investor” from the primary and sole source, Bursa Malaysia, 
but for a longer sample period of 16 years from 2000 to 2015. The dataset first divides 
investors into two major groups – Malaysian and foreign – and further classifies them 
into seven types: (1) individuals; (2) banks; (3) investment trusts; (4) other corporations; 
(5) government agencies; (6) nominees; and (7) other. For each investor type, we are 
supplied with the total number of shareholders and the total number of shares as of 
December of each year. Following the convention in the literature, we put banks, 
investment trusts and other corporations under the category of institutions.  
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Table 11 
Corporate Political Connections and Liquidity-Firm Value Relationship 
 
Fung et al. (2015) Wong (2016) Tee et al. (2017) 
CPQS -0.0680*** -0.0622*** -0.0678*** 
 (0.0071) (0.0075) (0.0071) 
CPQS2 0.0014*** 0.0012*** 0.0014*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
ln SIZE -0.2042*** -0.1929*** -0.1983*** 
 (0.0287) (0.0270) (0.0285) 
ln AGE 0.0048 0.0067 0.0063 
 (0.0270) (0.0278) (0.0271) 
LEV 0.7234*** 0.7252*** 0.7228*** 
 (0.1196) (0.1198) (0.1210) 
SALES  -0.00003 -0.00005 -0.00005 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
CAPEX 0.5908** 0.5421* 0.5899** 
 (0.2676) (0.2774) (0.2794) 
VOL 0.0135 0.0143 0.0140 
 (0.0110) (0.0111) (0.0110) 
ROA 1.4433*** 1.4301*** 1.4503*** 
 (0.3411) (0.3475) (0.3448) 
KLCI 0.5039*** 0.5280*** 0.5005*** 
 (0.0885) (0.0958) (0.0872) 
ln BSIZE 0.0604 0.0658 0.0555 
 (0.0568) (0.0538) (0.0549) 
BINDEP -0.0155 -0.0127 -0.0036 
 (0.0945) (0.0970) (0.0932) 
DUAL -0.0335 -0.0395 -0.0509 
 (0.0505) (0.0478) (0.0498) 
CHAIR 0.0643** 0.0684** 0.0692** 
 (0.0313) (0.0314) (0.0317) 
PCON 0.8660*** 0.2224*** 1.0463*** 
 (0.2011) (0.0765) (0.2941) 
PCON x CPQS -0.7061*** -0.1115*** -1.1106*** 
 (0.1533) (0.0211) (0.3056) 
PCON x CPQS2 0.1188*** 0.0064*** 0.2699*** 
 (0.0246) (0.0012) (0.0765) 
CONSTANT 3.4757*** 3.3019*** 3.3979*** 
 (0.4012) (0.3764) (0.3946) 
    
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
N 12,349 12,349 12,349 
Adj. R2 0.2119 0.2064 0.2076 
Notes:  The definitions for all the variables are provided in the Appendix. This table presents the OLS 
estimation results for the augmented model in equation (4) where the dependent variable is 
Tobin’s Q over the sample period 2000-2015. For brevity, year and industry dummies are 
suppressed but available upon request. Double-clustered standard errors are reported in the 
parentheses. N denotes the number of firm-year observations.  
***
, 
** and 
* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
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To test hypotheses H3 and H4, we augment the baseline quadratic model with the new 
ownership variable of OWN and its interaction terms with the key variable of liquidity, 
written as follows:  
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Ownership (OWN) is computed as the total shares held by each investor group divided 
by the total shares outstanding in each firm at the end of every calendar year. We enter 
the different types of investor shareholdings separately into equation (5). Apart from 
foreign nominee ownership and local institutional ownership as clearly specified in the 
hypotheses, we also include other investor types to provide a complete analysis on the 
impact of investor heterogeneity on liquidity-firm value relationship. 
 
The estimation results for equation (5) are presented in Table 12. Despite the inclusion 
of OWN in the baseline model, the coefficients for CPQS and CPQS2 remain highly 
significant with the U-shaped relationship unaffected across all six investor types – 
foreign institutions, foreign individuals, foreign nominees, local institutions, local 
individuals and local nominees. The interaction terms of CPQSOWN x  and 
2 x CPQSOWN  are highly significant for foreign nominee ownership. The turning 
point suggests that stocks with high foreign nominee ownership must be traded at a 
relatively higher level of liquidity before reaping the value benefit, thus lending support 
to hypothesis H3 which can be attributed to the stock price informativeness channel.
19 
Consistent with Lim et al. (2016), we find that the significant result is not due to the 
nominee effect per se but the foreign nature of ownership, as the interaction terms with 
                                                          
19 In equation (5), the turning point for CPQS is  OWN)γOWN)/2(γγ(γ 172161  . For hypotheses H3 
and H4 to be true, the turning point must be smaller (i.e., occurring at higher liquidity) when the level of 
ownership is higher. The condition is therefore: 
162γγ > 171γγ . In Table 12, our results show that the 
estimates for 1, 2, 16 and 17 are all statistically significant for foreign nominee and foreign institutional 
ownership. Taken together, the above condition is met for these two foreign ownership categories. This 
indicates that the turning point for the U-shape liquidity-firm value curve occurs at a higher liquidity 
level for higher foreign ownership. This supports hypothesis H3 that a higher liquidity level is needed for 
firms with high foreign nominee ownership to reap the value benefit. For the local institutional 
ownership, as the estimates for 16 and 17 are not significant, the condition is not statistically meaningful 
even if met. The subsample analysis for bottom 25% and top 25% ownership suggested by the reviewer 
has been conducted, and the unreported results are consistent with the interpretation of our interaction 
terms (OWN*CPQS and OWN*CPQS2) in model (5). 
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local nominees provide no statistically significant evidence that the liquidity-firm value 
relationship is stronger for firms with higher local nominee ownership.  
 
As for the corporate governance channel, the results in Table 12 show that the 
interaction terms of CPQSOWN x  and 
2 x CPQSOWN  are not statistically significant 
when local institutional ownership is entered into the regression. Although local 
institutional investors have been entrusted by the Malaysian government to spearhead 
shareholder activism, coupled with the empirical evidence that they play an effective 
monitoring and governance role among Malaysian publicly listed firms (Abdul Wahab 
et al., 2007; Ameer and Abdul Rahman, 2009), we do not find evidence to support 
hypothesis H4 that firms with high local institutional ownership require higher level of 
liquidity to reap the value benefit. This insignificant result could be due to two reasons: 
(1) the positive impact of local institutions on corporate governance might have become 
weaker in recent years; and (2) liquidity does not operate through the corporate 
governance channel in the Malaysian context.  
 
Table 12: Investor Heterogeneity and Liquidity-Firm Value Relationship 
      
  Industry CPQS CPQS2 OWN 
CPQS x 
OWN 
CPQS2 x 
OWN 
      
Panel A: Foreign Investors 
Foreign Institutional 
Ownership 
-0.0609*** 0.0012*** 0.0217*** -0.0083*** 0.0005*** 
(0.0073) (0.0002) (0.0048) (0.0016) (0.0001) 
Foreign Individual 
Ownership 
-0.0667*** 0.0013*** -0.0054** -0.0002 0.0001*** 
(0.0078) (0.0002) (0.0024) (0.0007) (0.00003) 
Foreign Nominee 
Ownership 
-0.0570*** 0.0010*** 0.0190*** -0.0053*** 0.0003*** 
(0.0063) (0.0001) (0.0033) (0.0010) (0.0001) 
      
Panel B: Local Investors 
Local Institutional 
Ownership 
-0.0628*** 0.0012*** 0.0014 -0.0002 0.000007 
(0.0084) (0.0002) (0.0010) (0.0002) (0.000005) 
Local Individual 
Ownership 
-0.1159*** 0.0023*** -0.0135*** 0.0013*** -0.00002*** 
(0.0155) (0.0004) (0.0015) (0.0002) (0.000007) 
Local Nominee 
Ownership 
-0.0643*** 0.0011*** -0.0005 -0.0003 0.00002*** 
(0.0084) (0.0002) (0.0013) (0.0003) (0.000009) 
Notes:  The definitions for all the variables are provided in the Appendix. This table presents the OLS 
estimation results for the augmented model in equation (5) where the dependent variable is Tobin’s 
Q over the sample period 2000-2015. For brevity, estimates for control variables, constant, industry 
and year dummies are suppressed but available upon request. Double-clustered standard errors are 
reported in the parentheses.  
              
***
, 
** and 
* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Addressing the first possibility, we note that our paper covers more sample firms (1250) 
over a longer sample period (2000-2015) than Abdul Wahab et al. (2007) and Ameer 
and Abdul Rahman (2009). The former collect data for 440 Malaysian public listed 
companies from 1999 to 2002, whereas the latter examine 224 listed firms over 2005-
2008. It thus warrants further study to examine the relationship between local 
institutional ownership and corporate governance using more recent data, especially 
data after the 2008/2009 global financial crisis. For the second possibility, we cannot 
completely rule out the role of corporate governance in shaping the liquidity-firm value 
relationship. The significant interaction terms when foreign institutional ownership 
serves as the proxy for OWN in equation (5) lends some weight to our conjecture. 
Furthermore, there is indirect empirical evidence suggesting that foreign institutional 
investors in Malaysia promote good corporate governance practices among their 
investee companies. For instance, Foong and Lim (2016) find that foreign institutional 
ownership is negatively and significantly associated with cost of equity, and their 
interaction analysis suggests it operates through the corporate governance channel. The 
significant relationship disappears, however, when foreign nominees enter the model, 
possibly because they do not exert influence on the corporate governance process. 
Using data on Malaysian listed firms from 2003 to 2011, Tee et al. (2017) show that 
institutional ownership is positively and significantly associated with audit fees, 
suggesting that institutions play an effective monitoring role by demanding greater 
audit efforts and thus higher audit fees. Their disaggregate analysis reveals that the 
significant result is driven only by foreign institutional investors, while the coefficient 
for local institutions is statistically insignificant.  
 
7. Conclusion 
Using the emerging Malaysian stock market as a laboratory, this paper provides at least 
three additional insights to the empirical literature of liquidity and firm value. First, we 
find that previous consensus of a positive linear relationship between liquidity and firm 
value, largely drawn from mature developed markets, cannot be generalized to 
Malaysian stocks due to differences in institutional setting, level of information 
efficiency, ownership structure, shareholder activism and investor sophistication. 
Instead, the baseline quadratic model shows that liquidity is nonlinearly associated with 
firm value, with the beneficial effects only kicking in when liquidity exceeds the 
threshold level. Second, the analysis complements existing evidence on the value 
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impact of establishing close ties with top politicians or political parties in power. More 
specifically, corporate political connections strengthen the liquidity-firm value 
relationship, in which the value impact occurs only at a higher level of liquidity for 
politically connected firms than their non-connected peers. Third, two unique 
Malaysian institutional features – the higher efficiency of stocks with greater foreign 
nominee ownership and the government mandate for state-backed local institutions to 
spearhead shareholder activism – provide an ideal setting to test two important channels 
driving liquidity-firm value relation, namely, stock price informativeness and corporate 
governance, respectively. We find liquidity to be a more important criterion for value 
impact to set in for firms with higher foreign nominee ownership and foreign 
institutional ownership. 
 
In addition to the above scholarly contributions, our study has direct implications for 
exchange regulators and publicly listed firms in Malaysia. In terms of policy 
implications, the evidence that the value benefit will only kick in at a higher level of 
liquidity suggests additional government effort is needed. It is generally acknowledged 
that emerging market firms still suffer from poor liquidity relative to their counterparts 
in developed economies (see Lesmond, 2005; Griffin et al., 2010). While numerous 
initiatives have been undertaken by the stock exchange since the inception of Bursa 
Malaysia (see Lim et al., 2017), our finding commends the Malaysian government’s 
efforts to further liberalize the Malaysian stock market since 2009 given that the value 
impact demands a more liquid market for stocks with higher foreign ownership. For 
publicly listed firms, our finding lends further support to the repeated calls by Amihud 
and Mendelson (1988, 1991, 2000, 2008) for managers to actively pursue liquidity-
enhancing policies. We caution that firms should evaluate the costs and benefits of these 
policies, however, as achieving a higher level of liquidity incurs greater costs that might 
outweigh the value benefit. Nevertheless, the local bourse will benefit greatly if 
regulators and listed firms cooperate and make concerted efforts to improve liquidity.  
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Appendix: Definitions for All Variables 
Variables Definitions 
Q Tobin’s Q ratio is the measure of firm value, computed as the market value 
of assets scaled by the book value of assets at year-end. Following Fang et 
al. (2009), the numerator is computed as the market value of common 
equity plus book value of assets minus the sum of the book value of 
common equity and balance sheet deferred taxes. The book value of assets 
serves as the proxy for the replacement value of assets in the denominator. 
CPQS Our main proxy of liquidity is the “Closing Percent Quoted Spread” 
proposed by Chung and Zhang (2014), computed as the ratio of the 
difference of closing ask and closing bid prices over the mid-point of these 
prices. The CPQS is computed using daily data, and then averaged to obtain 
the liquidity estimate for each year and each stock. 
ILLIQ Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio is used as an alternative liquidity measure 
in the robustness check, computed as the daily ratio of the absolute stock 
returns to the local currency trading volume. The annual ILLIQ estimates 
for each stock are obtained by averaging the computed daily ratios across 
all trading days for each year. 
CPQSIM The price impact version of the CPQS is used as an alternative liquidity 
measure in the robustness check, computed as the daily ratio of the CPQS 
scaled by the local currency trading volume. The annual CPQSIM 
estimates for each stock are obtained by averaging the computed daily 
ratios across all trading days for each year. 
ln SIZE Natural logarithm of firm size, measured by the book value of total assets 
at year-end.  
ln AGE Natural logarithm of firm age, proxied by the number of years since 
incorporation prior to year-end.  
LEV Leverage is computed as the ratio of book value of debts over the book 
value of assets at year-end. 
SALES Sales growth is defined as the annual percentage change in sales.  
CAPEX The ratio of capital expenditures over the book value of assets measured at 
year-end. 
VOL Volatility is computed as the standard deviation of daily stock returns over 
the year. 
ROA Return on assets is computed as the operating income divided by the book 
value of assets measured at year-end.  
KLCI A dummy variable of stock index membership which takes a value of one 
if a stock is included in the main index of the Malaysian stock market 
(namely Kuala Lumpur Composite Index prior to 6 July 2009, and FTSE 
Bursa Malaysia KLCI Index thereafter), and zero otherwise.   
ln BSIZE Natural logarithm of board size, measured by the total number of directors 
on a firm’s board at year-end. 
BINDEP Board independence is proxied by the ratio of independent non-executive 
directors over board size at year-end. 
DUAL A CEO duality dummy variable which takes a value of one if the chief 
executive officer is also the board chairman at year-end, zero otherwise.  
CHAIR A dummy variable which takes a value of one if the board chairman is an 
independent non-executive director at year-end, zero otherwise.  
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PCON A dummy variable which takes a value of one if a firm is politically 
connected, zero otherwise. We use three separate lists of patronized 
Malaysian corporations constructed by Fung et al. (2015), Wong (2016) 
and Tee et al. (2017). 
OWN Corporate ownership is computed as the total shares held by each investor 
group divided by the total shares outstanding in each firm at year-end.  
From the complete ownership dataset provided by Bursa Malaysia, we 
compute foreign institutional ownership, foreign individual ownership, 
foreign nominee ownership, local institutional ownership, local individual 
ownership and local nominee ownership.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
